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ulty member. I could not risk becoming a perennial student. We
communicated fairly often, but then, a few years later (1955), he
committed suicide. That means that there will be no history of those
with Brunswik, is approaching you with the following question: ‘Ken, thanks a lot
for your wonderful and inspiring essay. I am interested in intuition and the role
it  plays in organizational decision making. I have the feeling that what you wrote
needs to be considered in my further studies of this issue, but could you please give
me  some guidelines, concrete ideas, or recommendations how to do this exactly?”
What would you tell to this student? We think this would be a nice end of your
story that would link the past (when you have been a young student) to the future
(of  those who are young today).”
Ken Hammond replied “Your request sent me to look for my recent article “Quasira-vailable online 18 July 2015
No doubt my  long life as a student of judgment and decision
aking inﬂuences my  choice of topics for this issue of the jour-
al. I began my  life as a scholar in 1945, immediately after WW2,
hen I returned to the University of California at Berkeley, to
nd Egon Brunswik a professor of psychology, undoubtedly as
npopular as ever as a teacher and a colleague, and as masterful
nd brilliant as ever as a scholar, whose depth and commitment
ere unmatched, yet unrecognized by few if any of his contempo-
aries except Edward Tolman, fortunately then the Chairman of the
epartment. I say “fortunately”, for if it were not for Tolman, the
tudents, and regrettably, I must add, his colleagues would have
orced him out of the department. He was just too much for them.
olman wrote a letter to the President of the University stating in
nmistakable terms (I have seen the letter) that if Brunswik were
orced out, as colleagues and students demanded, he would resign
mmediately. The president held ﬁrm, Brunswik was retained, and
he psychology building at the university is named the “Edward C.
olman” building.Although few knew about this episode (I learned about it 20
ears later) everyone knew about Brunswik’s demanding schol-
rship and unpopularity among the students, graduate as well as
E-mail addresses: Ulrich.Hoffrage@unil.ch, t.stewart@albany.edu
∗ Editorial note: We were extremely delighted when Ken Hammond, founder of
he  Brunswik Society, the second President of the Society of Judgment and Decision
aking, and founder of the Institute of Behavioral Science at the University of Col-
rado, accepted our personal invitation to contribute to this special issue. In fact,
e  was  the ﬁrst one who  submitted a manuscript! In our response we  said: “. . .
our  focus is on Brunswik, speciﬁcally, on representative design. The focus of our
pecial Issue is on intuitive decision making, in particular in organizational settings.
bviously, there is a link, and we listed Brunswik’s representative design as one of
he  bullet points on which authors could focus. Ken, we would be grateful if you
ould make a bit more effort to elaborate on this link. You started your piece with
our personal story: You as a student of Brunswik who inspired you and who  had a
ajor inﬂuence on your career. Imagine we  print your manuscript as it currently is
nd a young student, maybe the same age you had back then when you interacted
ttp://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jarmac.2015.07.002
211-3681/© 2015 Society for Applied Research in Memory and Cognition. Published by
reativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).undergraduate. He was  not unpopular because he was a rude or
unpleasant person, however; his manners were impeccable. But
when it came to scholarship, he simply was a perfectionist, and
few chose to become his student. Even I could see the risks in his
demand for perfection, and I did my  dissertation with another fac-tionality Yes, Intuition No”. I don’t think I can do any better than this. Take a look at
it.  You might even like it!—Ken”. Of course we liked it and we felt the ideas that he
discussed in this paper (Hammond, 2010) would be an excellent ﬁt to the present
special issue. So we  asked whether it would “be possible to somehow integrate the
bottom line of this Quasirationality paper into your manuscript for our special issue?
Maybe as a short section at the end?” His reply: “I’m working on this—Ken”.
This was  the last mail we received from him. Knowing that he had to go to
the hospital a while before, but not knowing to what extent he recovered and
how good his health actually was, we did not dare to send reminders. On April
28th, 2015, Ken Hammond passed away at a “biblical” age of 98 after a career
spanning seven decades of theoretical and empirical contributions to the ﬁeld
of  judgment and decision research (for obituaries, see http://www.fabbs.org/
index.php?cID=165 and http://www.legacy.com/obituaries/dailycamera/obituary.
aspx?pid=174763911). The present paper, for sure one among the last (if not the
last) he has written, takes us back to the very beginning of his career – back to
the 1940s at the University of California, Berkeley – but then covers six decades of
discussion centering around the concept of representative design (Brunswik, 1956;
Dhami, Hertwig, & Hoffrage, 2004; Hammond, 1954; Hammond & Wascoe, 1980)
and  its implications for psychological research.
We  would like to thank Tom Stewart who helped us with editing this manuscript
and with identifying some of the references and quotes Ken Hammond included.
 Elsevier Inc. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://
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ays written by Brunswik. So I have taken upon myself to present
y view, and that is what leads us to the content of this article, and
o my  explanation of why psychology is in such trouble today.
Psychology began as an offshoot of philosophy that wanted
ore empirical evidence for the truth or falsity of the assertions
f its spokespersons regarding the causal relations among its many
nterdependent variables. In order to seek that evidence, it found
he practice of experiments that varied one variable while hold-
ng all others constant to be practicable and convincing. As soon
s that practice became standard, psychology became a scientiﬁc
iscipline, and all its students learned how to do their work in that
ashion. It remains at the core of all research based on experiments
oday. But many have recognized that its day is, or should be, over,
nd what follows explains why that is so and what needs to be
one to maintain the scientiﬁc character of this profession, one
hat now seems to be in trouble because of the standard design of
ts experiments implicitly remains in favor of establishing causality
ver generality (all this is laid out in detail in Hammond & Stewart,
001).
. Psychophysics
Known to many as the most boring topic they ever encountered,
sychophysics also enjoyed, if that is the right word, a reputation for
eing the most disappointing subject ever encountered. Students
nthusiastically signed up for courses in psychology, anticipat-
ng intriguing material about sex and other forbidden topics, but
ound themselves listening to lectures about perceptual stimuli and
uditory responses. Brunswik entered this situation about 1937 at
erkeley and was appointed Professor in 1938. That was  because
dward Tolman, then Chairman of the Department, discovered
runswik during a sabbatical year in Vienna. He much admired
runswik, and they published a signiﬁcant paper together (Tolman
 Brunswik, 1935) that reﬂected Brunswik’s general views in the
sychological Review.
There could hardly have been a worse time for this appointment.
runswik was certainly ready to break away from psychophysics,
nd Tolman certainly was ready to accommodate that break,
lthough it would have to be on Brunswik’s terms, which means
hat it would have to be done on the basis of scholarship. But
tudents were not ready for discussions of “distal–proximal” rela-
ionships and the like. As a result they were left wondering why
hey were listening to this obscure material that, worse still, was
resented in Brunswik’s heavily German-accented English. I recall
eeking into a Brunswik lecture while wandering down a corridor
nd ﬁnding his wife, Else Frenkel–Brunswik, sitting in his classroom
ffering English words as substitutions for his German ones. These
ere not happy days of learning.
The language situation improved rather smoothly but the heavy,
bstract psychological content remained a problem that was largely
mpossible for undergraduates, and few graduate students found
ny reason to put up with it, other than anticipating encounter-
ng more of the same on progressive admission tests. For my  part,
 found it all very stimulating, and together with a Japanese stu-
ent (Joe Kamiya) developed strong interest in learning more. But
runswik’s seminars were a real challenge because of the high level
f performance he demanded and in these seminars students found
t necessary to tightly organize their responses. I recall (this must
ave been about 1947) that on one occasion in which I thought I
ad found a point that would have been very troubling for him, I
lotted with my  colleague Kamiya just exactly what the content of
ur presentation would be. Then, after my  ﬁrst sentence, we  kept
rack of the time that Brunswik spoke, and noted with consider-
ble glee, that he took up the entire remaining time of the seminar
which, by the way, I recall my  student colleague and I thoroughly Memory and Cognition 4 (2015) 176–179 177
enjoyed, mainly because he brought up the topic of the design of
experiments)!
This should have been a fascinating topic for graduate students,
for it runs deep as the basis for research—but it wasn’t. As far as I can
understand it, the reason for that was  the stubborn (I use the word
advisedly) resistance of faculty members at every institution I have
ever been associated with, to resist whole-heartedly his approach.
Students recognized this faculty resistance, and few ever became
devotees (at least in public) of Brunswik. It got to the point that if
you showed your interest in him it meant that you had no interest
in them. And they were right about that. For his concept of the repre-
sentative design of experiments simply means that one should be as
rigorous about one’s inductive inferences over the object, or stim-
ulus, side of the experiment as over the subject side. This means
that one is interested in generalization as well as causality. Act-
ing in accordance with that principle changes (almost) everything
that the student thought s/he had learned about research. (This
concept is developed in detail in his “Perception and the Represen-
tative Design of Psychological Experiments” (Brunswik, 1956); in
my view a marvelous book; see also Hammond & Stewart, 2001).
Few, if any, recognized this 1956 book as containing the seeds
of a revolution in science. Much the same thing had happened in
physics when Einstein (1905) at the turn of the century opened
the eyes of physicists to far-reaching space, and tiny particles, thus
changing the frame of reference from a “small world” (in which
Newton’s physics worked very well) to a “large world” (in which
they didn’t—as he and others) pointed out in 1938; Einstein & Infeld,
1938/1961). Einstein put it this way: “When formulating the prin-
cipal clews of mechanics we  omitted one important point. We  did
not state for which coordinate system they are valid. For this rea-
son, the whole of classical mechanics hangs in mid-air since we  do
not know to which frame it refers” (Einstein & Infeld, 1938/1961).
Who  would have believed the “whole of classical mechanics hangs
in mid-air” in 1938 if Einstein hadn’t said it?
Few did believe it at the start despite the detailed mathemat-
ics (see Kumar, 2008). But the real question for the readers of this
article is: Who  would have believed that this distinction between
Newton’s “small world” and Einstein’s “large world” would have
any relevance for experimental psychology? The answer to that
question is easy: “no one” (at least no one I know of mentioned it).
But in 2012 two  psychologists did mention it; Brighton and
Gigerenzer (2012), in a badly needed, brilliant paper used this very
distinction – “small world” vs. “large world” – in a step to clarify
the distinction between the “coordinate systems” of two cogni-
tive environments. They wished to emphasize that each “world”
requires different cognitive activity. The logical (“small”) world
requires the development of different principles of cognitive activ-
ity than the “large” ecological one. They don’t claim that “small
worlds” principles are wrong for those small worlds; they simply
require replacement by different principles when the subject must
deal with “large worlds”, by which Brighton and Gigerenzer mean
the ecological worlds encountered by human judgment. And since
the frame to which classical psychophysics belong was never spec-
iﬁed (as was  also the case in classical mechanics), should we say
that the psychophysics – as well as classical mechanics – of the 20th
century and earlier “hangs in mid-air”? Perhaps that was  the cause
of the students’ boredom?
Be that as it may, Brunswik (1943), and Brighton and Gigerenzer
(2012), set about arguing for a psychology of judgment and deci-
sion making that would apply to an ecological (“large world”)
instead of a logical (“small world”)—to which Kahneman (2011)
wished to apply his ideas about judgment and decision making.
That required them to develop a description of the properties of
a “large world”, which they did. These were the same ecological
properties that Brunswik tried so hard to convince his colleagues
were the important elements of judgment and decision making,
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ut which his colleagues rejected (see Hammond & Stewart, 2001).
righton and Gigerenzer, however, could elaborate upon them in
 brilliant mathematical development, and they did. Just exactly
hy it took the period from Brunswik (1943) to Brighton and
igerenzer (2012) to make this sharp distinction in the method-
logical forefront of psychology I leave to others. It will be difﬁcult
o refute Brighton and Gigerenzer. The arguments that Clark used
o reject my  1951 paper on representative design will not work
Hammond, 1951; see also Brunswik, 1951).
I cannot summarize their work here, but the following quote
ay  speak for itself:
Stochasticity is the most basic form of discrepancy between
agent and environment. It arises due to external randomness
and cannot be eliminated through further observation, or by
designing the organism differently. For example, even though
an agent knows that a die is fair, it will make errors when pre-
dicting rolls of the die (Figure 5.1, point A). In short, even when
granted full causal knowledge of the process governing observa-
tions – such as knowledge of physical probabilities (Giere, 1999),
propensities (Popper, 1959), or a priori probabilities (Knight,
1921) – the agent will still make errors when predicting events
under conditions of stochasticity. (Brighton & Gigerenzer, 2012,
p. 88).
. Representative design of experiments
Prior to Brunswik one ordinarily began with the subject, or sub-
ects, usually a person, or persons, facing some fraction of the world,
nd choosing how to behave in it. Now however, with a frank and
xplicit recognition that one’s inferences about the application of
he results will depend on whichever aspects of the ecology were
ncluded in the experiment (just as application of the results will
epend on whichever aspects of the population of subjects were
ncluded in the study), we experimenters will now look ﬁrst at
he ecological aspect of the experiment. That’s different, and far
ore complicated, and that’s why I said the reason for the divide
etween those who took Brunswik seriously and those who didn’t
s important.
Once we do consider the ecological side of the inference, we  will
bserve tremendous variability from the simple to the complex in
he circumstances to which we will want to generalize the results
f our experiment. Of course, if we are researchers who want to
tudy causality, we will want to choose very simple ecological con-
itions; that will make it easy to test our hypotheses and easy to
xplain them to others. But the simpler they are the less interesting
hey will be, and the less impressed our audience will be. Early on,
hen psychologists were interested mainly in causality, simplicity
as the obvious choice, and the psychophysics of one dimensional
r two dimensional ecologies were appropriate for study. But as
he complexity of the ecology began to demand more attention,
nd as social psychology came to be seen as more “do-able “with
he advent of computers, simplicity became less attractive, and
he problem of inductive inference over complex ecologies became
ore visible and more interesting and attractive. (And now there
s something called “Complex System Science”.)
This matter rose to the point where Kahneman thought it
orthy of mention in his recent best-selling “Thinking, Fast and
low” (Kahneman, 2011, see especially pp. 5–7), and declared
is purposes to be short of completely defensible inferences over
ircumstances. That enabled him to present his information and
rgument at a level most readers could comprehend and enjoy.
nd as a result he offers demonstrations of his arguments rather
han experimental proof. This procedure certainly succeeded—up
o a point. Memory and Cognition 4 (2015) 176–179
It was an odd point that brought this tactic into trouble.
Kahneman (2011) had been impressed with some studies that were
concerned with what the authors called “priming” effects which
seemed to show that mentioning a given word would affect a sub-
ject’s frequency of observation of this attribute in the behavior of
others. He reported this phenomenon as if it were a product of sci-
entiﬁc research, however, and that brought what Kahneman later
called a “storm” of criticism from numerous authors over what he
called a lack of “robustness” of this ﬁnding. And that so disturbed
Kahneman that he wrote the following letter that found its way  to
the Internet:
Dear colleagues,
As all of you know, of course, questions have been raised about
the robustness of priming results. The storm of doubts is fed by
several sources, . . .
My  reason for writing this letter is that I see a train wreck loom-
ing. I expect the ﬁrst victims to be young people on the job
market. Being associated with a controversial and suspicious
ﬁeld will put them at a severe disadvantage in the competi-
tion for positions. Because of the high visibility of the issue, you
may  already expect the coming crop of graduates to encounter
problems. Another reason for writing is that I am old enough to
remember two  ﬁelds that went into a prolonged eclipse after
similar outsider attacks on the replicability of ﬁndings: sublim-
inal perception and dissonance reduction.
I believe that you should collectively do something about
this mess. To deal effectively with the doubts you should
acknowledge their existence and confront them straight on,
because a posture of deﬁant denial is self-defeating. Specif-
ically, I believe that you should have an association, with a
board that might include prominent social psychologists from
other ﬁelds. The ﬁrst mission of the board would be to orga-
nize an effort to examine the replicability of priming results,
following a protocol that avoids the questions that have been
raised and guarantees credibility among colleagues outside the
ﬁeld.
The following is just an example of such a protocol:
Assemble a group of ﬁve labs, where the leading investiga-
tors have an established reputation (tenure should perhaps be
a requirement). Substantial labs with several students are the
most desirable participants.
Each lab selects a recent demonstration of a priming effect,
which they consider robust and most likely to replicate.
The board makes a public commitment to these ﬁve speciﬁc
effects
Set up a daisy chain of labs A-B-C-D-E-A, where each lab will
replicate the study selected by its neighbor: B replicates A, C
replicates B etc.
Have the replicating lab send someone to see how subjects are
run (hence the emphasis on recency—the experiments should
be in the active repertoire of the original lab, so that additional
subjects can be run with conﬁdence that the same procedure is
followed).
Have the replicated lab send someone to vet the procedure of
the replicating lab as it starts its work
Run enough subjects to guarantee power (probably more than
in the original study)Use technology (e.g. video) to ensure that every detail of the
method is documented and can be copied by others.
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Pre-commit to publish the results, letting the chips fall where
they may, and make all data available for analysis by others
(Kahneman, 2012).
The reader will recognize, as have many others, that Kahne-
an  is recommending a process unlikely ever to be carried out and
nsatisfactory if it is (it is puzzling why he didn’t notice this). So
ere we have an instance of the recognition of the problem of gen-
ralization (here called “robustness”) but only a very poor method
successive additions and repetitions) of addressing it. Worse still,
he concept of “robustness” seems to blur the distinction between
reliability”, that is, “replicability” and validity, speciﬁcally, exter-
al validity. The explicit use of representative design, made known
o us 50 years ago (Brunswik, 1956), addressed the problem of gen-
ralization; had it been employed at the outset, all this would have
een avoided.
. Tetlock’s achievement of generalization and disproof of
thers’ claims
But we can now turn to the opposite – Tetlock’s astonishing
chievement of generalization, by means of representative design
almost) – that shook the foundations of political forecasting (see
or example Silver, 2012; Tetlock, 2005). But, as is customary, there
as no recognition of the situation in terms of experimental design.
etlock (2005) set out to discover just how good, that is, how accu-
ate political forecasting by “experts” is simply by checking the
orrespondence of their predictions with the actual events they
redicted. The answer, he found, was simple: “not very.”
Tetlock recognized and made considerable use of the
Correspondence–Coherence” alternative I introduced in
ammond (1996, p. 106). He also makes extensive use but
oes not acknowledge, my  introduction of, a “Cognitive Contin-
um” (Hammond, 1981) when he makes considerable use of Isaiah
erlin’s famous distinction between “foxes” and “hedgehogs” as an
nalogy for distinguishing between two types of thinkers (Tetlock,
005, p. 2). Tetlock does not further make explicit use of the idea of
 “continuum” but separates, as does Kahneman, these two ways
f thinking into “categories”, or “types” (e.g. System 1, or System
) rather than points on a continuum. Neither he nor Kahneman
ake an issue of this distinction; both clearly treat these concepts
requently as points on a continuum as well as categories. Explicitly
reating this important concept as a continuum allows a more
seful analysis of its relation to other more technical aspects of
ognitive activity in place of such terms as “lazy” etc. as both
ahneman and Tetlock do.
. The “train wreck”
What Kahneman describes as a “train wreck” is indeed a big
roblem, and that is that consumers and psychologists alike are
eginning to see psychology, particularly social psychology, as a
iscipline that produces undependable results, that is, results that
an’t be replicated or generalized. Strangely, at the same time as
his bad news is developing, NSF is seeing more clearly the need for
he kind of dependable evidence that psychological science aims
o produce in relation to public policy. Unfortunately, the current
iagnosis of the difﬁculty is wrong, and will do little more than
ncourage the kind of remedy Kahneman suggests, which, since
t is based on an incorrect diagnosis of the problem will get us
owhere. The correct remedy for arguments about generalizations
rom experiments is not more replication of experiments designed
o analyze causality, but more use of experiments speciﬁcally Memory and Cognition 4 (2015) 176–179 179
designed for generalization. That argument has been with us for a
long time; the remedy for ecological generalization is the same as
the remedy we  have accepted for generalization over subjects—the
logic of generalization through sampling, all of which was laid out
by Brunswik beginning in 1943 (see also Hammond & Stewart,
2001).
5. Summary
I introduce the regrettable story of Egon Brunswik’s efforts to
enlighten psychologists about the effects of various designs of
experiments on the permissible conclusions and generalization to
be drawn there from. I did so for two reasons: (1) I sat at his
feet, so to speak, for several years, and developed an emotional
tie because of that. (Was my  positive emotion returned? I think so,
but only after many years; he surely wanted to fail me  on my  PhD
exam—justiﬁably, I think, but years later by virtue of papers pub-
lished, I “passed”.) (2) The negative treatment of his efforts (and
mine) by the majority of psychologists is a part of the history of
psychology that will never be found in the history books, yet it
profoundly affected the course of that history.
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